STRATEGIC CULTURE OF JAPAN

Table of Content

1. QUESTION

2. INTRODUCTION

• Concept of strategic culture (with different definitions of philosphers)
• Example of a country (US and Russia){what defines a country’s strategic cultural exchange}
• Sources of strategic culture
• Historical starting point for the research of strategic culture

3.`JAPAN’S STRATEGIC CULTURE

• Historical overview of Japan strategic culture
• Asianism and antimilitarism as the root of Japan’s Strategic Culture
• The Evolution of Japan’s Strategic Culture

4.CONCLUSION

QUESTION:

What is the concept of strategic culture and what defines country’s strategic culture? What is the strategic culture of japan and from where it originated? Describe the current scenarios of japan strategic policy.

INTRODUCTION:

“You don’t have to burn books to destroy a culture. Just get people to stop reading them "

The term strategic culture is not a new one and has become increasingly important in field of strategic studies. For almost four decades ago this topic is on debate and it impelled us to think on strategy and the strategic choices in politics. After the post-cold war era culture has become a mode in prevailing international relations. This interest is due to emanating consent of national security policy.In order to understand the security policies of an institution (e.g. EU, UN) or region (e.g. Pacific) or state (e.g. Japan or US), strategic culture has been practiced in various aspects. As far it is concerned that why we have to study strategic culture it is because that it attempts to make a framework which can give rational answers as to why certain policy options are pursued by states.

In the cold war era super powers i.e. USA and Soviet were failed to forecast each other actions and reactions as they took presupposed the fact that they would react, analyze and interpret same in certain situations but eventually it proved wrong and they came to a conclusion that this ‘behavioral prediction’ is baseless. Hence in 20^thcentury a new wave of literature emerges and attract the attention of strategic studies theorists and focused them on the development of a new tool of analysis notably that of strategic culture and from there it is originated as a subject in academia. Strategic culture is basically a collection of historical commemoration which influences states security policies and international relations.

According to lain Johnston we discover three generations of strategic culture scholar. In first generation a scholar named Snyder describe it in 1977 to interpret soviet nuclear strategy as

‘a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns with regard to nuclear strategy that has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of “cultural” rather than mere policy’ 

According to Rosen “Strategic culture is comprised of ‘beliefs and assumptions that frame…. choices about international military behavior, particularly those concerning decisions to go to

war, preferences for offensive, expansionist or defensive modes of warfare, and levels of wartime casualties that would be acceptable”.

In mid-1980’s second generation scholars said the philosophy ‘peaceful through strengths’. In 1990’s a third generation of scholars rediscovered the rise of constructivism, Wendt argued that state identities and interest can be seen as “socially constructed by knowledgeable practice”.

The country’s strategic culture was originated by potential source i.e. physical (geography, climate natural resources), political (historical experiences, political system, elite beliefs, military organization), social or cultural (myths and symbol, defining tests, generational change, tech.

JAPAN’S STRATEGIC CULTURE

Like every country Japan has its own specific culture which follows constructivist approach. According to this approach Japanese strategic culture since WWII prevents any tendency to use military force and promote an ‘antimilitarist political-military culture’ which is due to passive resistance and dependence on the security alliance with US. Morgan builds a framework and analyze that Japan’s strategic culture changes its behavior first, in WW2 oil embargo intended to pressurize Tokyo to withdraw its military from China, second, Washington's 1945 efforts to force Japan to end the war and third, in 1895 intervention of three states Russia, Germany, and France to forced Japanese leaders to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China which follows the first Sino-Japanese War.

The current or the post WW2 Constitution of Japan was proclaimed on November 3, 1946, and fortified on May 3, 1947. The main feature of Japan’s constitution is pacifism. So according to Article 9 of the Constitution, Japan is allowed the Self Defense Forces (SDF): the Air SDF, the Maritime SDF, and the Ground SDF. They cannot be called land, sea and air forces (gun) because article 9 prohibits Japan from maintaining military forces. The Preamble of the Constitution proclaims:

‘We, the Japanese people, … resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government…’.

‘We … desire peace for all time … and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.’ 

the issue of war bur unfortunately japan didn’t won them as Japan's army and navy were depended on American raw materials and technology that why a question arises that from where those energy resources might provide and hence there became an impetus for a clash between the powers of East Asia. They go for war due to a valid outrage toward Britain and particularly the US because of the western refusal to accept Asians as equal to Europeans and North Americans, restraints on Japanese trade, unwillingness to allow the Japanese the same kind of freedom in Manchuria that Americans and British regularly took for themselves in Latin America and the British empire, and the insulting policies of the United States Toward Japanese immigration etc.

Hence after the post WW2 Japan’s Prime minister Yoshida Shigeru made a policy known as Yoshida doctrine that stressed that Japan focus on its own economic and technological development while establishing military security through alliance with the United States. basically it is Prime minister’s postwar recovery for japan. The policy led to phenomenal economic growth and continued to guide Japan's economic and foreign policies for many decades. From 1948 to early 1950, there was a difference of views between the U.S. State Department, the Defense Department, and SCAP regarding the post-war security of and against Japan. However, in September 1950, a basic agreement between them was decided. The joint memorandum regarding a Peace Treaty in Japan was drafted by the Secretaries of State and Defense, and was assented by President Harry S. Truman on September 8, 1950. Due to the strong wish to discontinue the occupation, eventually the Japanese government agreed that to became a peacekeeping nation it is necessary to undertake rearmament program. The treaty of peace with Japan was signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951 by Japan, the United States, and forty-seven other nations. After the Allied occupation was officially ended with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan became once again an independent state when the treaty went into effect on April 28, 1952, and due to that treaty the nation set about rebuilding itself from the destruction of war.

Many observers have stated that Japanese foreign policy is static, and that Japan is a reactive state, reluctant to take risk or declare its interests in the world.From the perspective of strategic culture, Thomas Berger stated that antimilitarist sentiments have become deeply institutionalized in Japan through a process of legitimated compromises. Japanese public opinion, despite the end of the Cold War and growing trade frictions with the United States, are in a favor of moderate approach to defense policy and they felt offensive by the acceleration of Japanese defense budget. Thomas Berger also mentions that there exists an antinomy among Japanese while they face the world. The Japanese felt that the US and other foreign nations had conducted a ruthless campaign of conquest in order to increase their own power and side by side they also felt that they had been victimized by the blind ambition of Japan’s wartime military leadership. The first reason led to the autonomous status of japan in world politics and the things which causes military expansion. On the contrary, the second one lead to the dominance of pacifism in Japan.

In order to legitimize military expansion Berger, stoke the fires of ethnocentric nationalism.

Conclusion

Strategic culture offers a way of understanding the state’s security policy and it is definitely not the last expediency. I assume that the root of Japan’s strategic culture is Asianism and antimilitarism. Reviewing the relationship between Japan and Asia in the past, we found that Asianism was good-will at the early stages but end up with tragedy of Pacific War. In the evolution of Asianism in the past, we learnt that Japan alone was unable to confront the West, and it must unite Asian countries and cooperate with them. While Japan becomes more autonomous in its foreign policy strengthening relationship with the Asian countries has come to its top priority. Besides positive participation in Asia, Japan even hopes to play a key role in the regional cooperation, and its relationship with China is out of question the most important. Japan’s direction is changing, but it moves on slowly in order to look for optimum equilibrium.

Constructivism cannot single-handedly produce predictions of political outcomes but it can inform the analyst as to the rationality of actors. Through constructivist approach we view the insight that how Japanese define security and how they have built their policy making mechanisms.

Pacifism is represented by a small portion of Japanese political culture. However, this does not make the wider populace pro-military. Rather, the value instilled in the Japanese during the Cold War was antimilitarism. As demonstrated above, Japan has not moved to increase its military

power, it has adjusted the capabilities of its military based on new threats and responsibilities, always adhering to the norm of antimilitarism.

The value of economism has merged into the concept of “comprehensive security” which holds that economic security is at least as important as military security. The concept further maintains that security is multi-faceted and must make use of diplomatic, economic and military instruments as part of a larger approach. Japan’s direction is changing, but it moves on slowly in order to look for optimum equilibrium.